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Education by Corporation
The Merits and Perils of For- Profit Higher Education for a 
Democratic Citizenry
Amy J. Sepinwall
For- profit colleges have elicited wildly divergent reactions, with critics vilify-
ing them and their executives, and supporters seeing in the institutions a nec-
essary and laudable complement to public and nonprofit institutions. As I 
propose in this chapter, the truth likely likes somewhere between these ex-
tremes. 
The for- profit educational sector has become an increasingly prominent 
and powerful presence within higher education. For- profit (FP) colleges have 
seen an average rate of growth of 9 percent per year, over each of the past 
thirty years.1 Today FPs educate roughly 1.4 million postsecondary students 
in the United States, accounting for 7 percent of all postsecondary students. 
The largest FP college system— the University of Phoenix— enrolls more stu-
dents than do all of the Big Ten schools together, and is second in student 
population only to the State University of New York.2
The growth of FPs can be gleaned not just from increasing student enroll-
ments over time, but also from increasing revenues. Thus, for example, the 
for- profit sector generated $9 billion in revenue in 2000, but $29.2 billion in 
2010;3 most of this was earned by thirteen large, publicly traded companies 
that dominate the for- profit higher education market.4 The sector has at-
tracted the attention of both venture capitalists and large institutional inves-
Education by Corporation 89
tors, who see an unprecedented opportunity in the confluence of new 
technologies and interest in nontraditional educational platforms.5 
While the public imagination casts the FP educational institution as bru-
tishly profit- oriented, and its not- for- profit (NFP) counterpart as high- 
mindedly unconcerned with revenues, the distinction between the two on this 
front is not so stark. NFPs need to be concerned about generating enough 
revenue to fund their activities. To this end, they often pursue profit- making 
activities— most obviously by fundraising and applying for grants, but also by 
securing patents for university- created products or technologies from which 
they can yield royalty fees, or by offering expensive degree or certificate pro-
grams for which the university does not extend financial aid.6 The key distinc-
tion between the FP and NFP entity, then, pertains not to whether the entity 
is permitted to earn revenue that exceeds operating costs but instead to what 
the entity may do with this surplus. In particular, the NFP must reinvest any 
surplus in the institution, whereas the FP institution is permitted to distribute 
the surplus to its owners or shareholders.7
The key source of revenue for FPs is student tuition. These institutions 
tend to cost less than private NFPs, but more than public colleges or uni-
versities. In 2010- 2011, for example— the most recent year for which na-
tional figures are available— the average cost at a public university for 
in- state students living on campus was $20,100, while the average cost for a 
four- year nonprofit college was $39,800 and $30,100 for a for- profit college. 
(Community colleges, the cheapest options, averaged $7,900.)8 The FP’s re-
liance on student tuition, in addition to the profit- making imperative that 
the FP institution owes its investors, accounts for many of the FP’s worst 
abuses.
This chapter incorporates considerations raised in the context of a panel 
discussion held at the University of Pennsylvania featuring three leaders in 
the for- profit education world.9 I propose here to amplify the conversation 
with reference to the existing literature on for- profit higher education. Com-
mentary on for- profit education proceeds along three narratives: the first 
views the for- profit college as a kind of villainous, unstoppable monster; the 
second, contrastingly, sees the for- profit college as a kind of savior; and the 
third takes a more nuanced position, identifying virtues of for- profit educa-
tion while expressing concern about its compatibility with education’s tradi-
tional democratic aims. I present and critique each of these narratives in 
turn. 
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For- Profits as Villains
Education, including higher education, is often seen as sacred— above base 
concerns about making money, and crucial to the advancement of the indi-
vidual and the society to which she belongs. To the extent that for- profit in-
stitutions problematize, if not pervert, this vision, these institutions are cast 
as enemies of the public good. Thus one critic likens the FP higher education 
sector to “the blob,”10 threatening to swallow and replace traditional institu-
tions, and another refers to the University of Phoenix in particular as “the 
anti- Christ.”11
Some of this criticism is fueled by those cases in which a for- profit college 
has willfully engaged in acts of deception or fraud. But for other critics, for- 
profit higher education is inherently repellent, even if not out- and- out crim-
inal, since the quest for profits is, they contend, necessarily in tension with 
educational quality. In its worst manifestation, the profit motive entails ex-
ploitation of the students whom these institutions target. But even when the 
institution’s conduct does not rise to the level of exploitation, the for- profit 
college is nonetheless alleged to shortchange those it is intended to serve, by 
privileging owners or shareholders over its student- consumers. I elaborate on 
each of these concerns in turn.
For- Profit Colleges and Illegal Activity
FP colleges have been charged with two kinds of statutory violation. First, 
some have offered incentive- based compensation to recruiters, keyed to the 
number of students the recruiters succeed in enrolling, in contravention of the 
Higher Education Act, which forbids this kind of compensation to entities 
receiving federal funds. For example, in 2004, the government sued the Apollo 
Group, parent company of the University of Phoenix, for its alleged pay- for- 
performance recruitment incentives. The company denied wrongdoing but 
nonetheless settled with the government for $78.5 million, believed to be one 
of the largest pay- for- performance compensation settlements ever reached.12
Second, many FP colleges have been found to have engaged in fraudulent 
or deceptive marketing practices. In 2010, for example, the Government Ac-
counting Office released a report based on an undercover investigation of 
fifteen FP colleges. The colleges in question were selected only because they 
received at least 89 percent of their funding from the federal government; 
prior to the investigation, there was nothing about the colleges that had 
alerted the GAO to any wrongdoing. Nonetheless, the GAO discovered that 
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all fifteen misled prospective applicants about the cost or value of the educa-
tion they would receive. For example, recruiters commonly stated that stu-
dents attend classes twelve months a year yet reported the tuition costs for just 
nine months of classes, thereby misleading the potential recruit about the full 
cost of tuition.13 In one instance, a recruiter told a prospective student that the 
massage therapy certificate program about which she was inquiring was a 
good value at $14,000 in tuition, yet a nearby community college offered the 
same certificate program for just $520.14 Worse still, four of the fifteen colleges 
encouraged prospective students to lie on their financial aid application 
forms— in one case urging the applicant to omit information about $250,000 
that he had in savings,15 and in another advising the applicant to fabricate 
three dependents in order to appear more needy.16
These examples involve clear ethical and legal breaches. Nonetheless, a few 
bad apples do not make for a bad tree: it is easy to see how the profit motive 
might make such breaches more likely, but there is nothing in the for- profit 
structure that renders fraud or deception necessary or inevitable. The merits 
of FP higher education cannot be decided on the basis of these lapses alone. 
However, if it turned out that the FP college’s quest for profits entailed wide-
spread abuses— whether the ones just detailed or instead efforts to exploit 
prospective students’ vulnerabilities, or sacrifice the quality of their education 
for the sake of lining shareholders’ pockets— we would then have more reason 
for concern. And indeed, FP colleges have been charged with just such abuses. 
For- Profit Colleges and Exploitation
Tales of FPs’ predatory recruitment practices abound. The University of Phoe-
nix and Chancellor’s School of Professional Studies, both for- profit institu-
tions, have targeted homeless shelters and halfway houses for potential 
students, seeking to enroll individuals who are recovering drug addicts or 
alcoholics, or convicted felons.17 Recruiters have also sought to prey upon 
minorities and other members of historically oppressed groups,18 and they 
have been especially keen to pursue military veterans, since veterans enjoy 
federal education benefits that do not count toward the 90 percent cap on 
federal funds imposed upon FP institutions.19
Recruiters are alleged to overstate the economic benefits of the degrees 
their institutions offer, and to minimize or fail altogether to disclose the diffi-
culties in repaying loans that their students face:20 many more students at 
for- profit institutions than at not- for- profit institutions carry federal loans— 
 86 versus 63 percent.21 And, while students at for- profit universities compose 
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just 10 percent of all college students in the United States, they represent 44 
percent of those who default on their federal college loans. Critics attribute 
the higher default rate to a greater rate of attrition at FPs— the graduation 
rates there are 28 percent, compared with 65 percent at NFPs.22 The low grad-
uation rates result, in turn, from the poor instructional quality and lack of 
support that FPs provide, critics contend. Yet even those who do graduate 
from FP colleges default more often than their NFP graduating counterparts, 
a disparity that critics attribute to the (purported) worthlessness of a degree 
from a FP institution.23
Because of these alleged abuses, Senator Tom Harkin, D- Illinois and chair 
of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, sought to 
investigate the for- profit higher education sector. The investigation culmi-
nated in a report, issued in August 2012, that contained, in Harkin’s words, 
“overwhelming documentation of exorbitant tuition, aggressive recruiting 
practices, abysmal student outcomes, taxpayer dollars spent on marketing and 
pocketed as profit, and regulatory evasion and manipulation.”24 
To the extent these abuses exist, they have been likened to the free riding 
and moral hazard that precipitated the housing market crisis. As Amitai Etzi-
oni quips, FPs “are making money not by producing a product and marketing 
it, but by loading consumers with loans they cannot pay and then sticking the 
taxpayers with the bill. Only this time, it’s not houses and mortgages but 
‘higher’ education and student loans.”25 One former admissions officer grew 
so disenchanted with the aggressive recruitment strategies he was expected to 
pursue that he decided to dramatize his experiences in a one- act play called 
For Profit, which toured the United States in 2012.26 In an interview, the play-
wright, Aaron Calafato, recounts that he was being pushed to enroll single 
mothers, recovering addicts, and others who had barely earned their high 
school equivalency diplomas, or could barely read— and all would come to 
carry heavy student loans.27 
Far from enhancing the financial prospects of the members of these vul-
nerable groups, it is clear that saddling them with loans that they will be un-
able to pay off imposes yet another obstacle on their paths to prosperity. But 
these unseemly and exploitative recruitment practices are not a necessary part 
of the for- profit landscape. Like the illegal activity detailed above, the preda-
tory practices of some for- profit educational institutions ought not to impugn 
the industry as a whole. We can readily imagine a for- profit college that en-
gages in a stringent vetting and admissions process, selecting only those stu-
dents who show the requisite promise, and who are made aware of the burdens 
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that college studies impose. Along these lines, Kaplan Higher Education al-
lows students to try out its college programs for three weeks, free of cost and 
with no record of matriculation should the student choose to leave after the 
trial period. In this way, prospective students are given the opportunity to see 
firsthand whether they can handle the work.28 Similarly, there are FP colleges 
that have developed a solid track record of placing their graduates in well- 
paying, secure jobs.29 Further, in addition to self- restraint, we can turn to 
government regulation to minimize opportunities for predation, through 
mandated disclosures to prospective students. Such initiatives are already un-
der way. For example, the U.S. Department of Education has proposed tougher 
rules forbidding colleges from paying recruiters on commission.30 And, a re-
cently issued Executive Order on recruitment of veterans also seeks to reduce 
their exploitation.31
Given the fact that FPs rely far more on tuition as a source of revenue than 
do public and NFP institutions, exploitative recruitment practices may be 
more common in the for- profit sector. But again, there is nothing about for- 
profit education that requires these practices. In any event, even if self- restraint 
or governmental regulation were to curtail these practices, there might still 
remain concerns with for- profit higher education, as we shall now see.
For- Profit Colleges and Shareholder Primacy
FP colleges need not resort to illegal or exploitative conduct in order to invite 
the suspicion that there is something untoward about their business model. 
For one thing, many people tend to view money- making as antithetical to the 
intellectual pursuits that we take to typify a university education. I defer con-
sideration of such concerns to a subsequent section, where I address the ques-
tion of whether FP higher education illicitly commodifies a good that should 
be beyond market value. Here, I consider whether the premium FPs place on 
generating financial returns for shareholders negatively affects the quality of 
the education they provide.
The traditional view of the for- profit corporation grants pride of place to 
the corporate shareholder: the purpose of the corporation, in this view— often 
called the shareholder primacy view— is to earn money for shareholders. 
Measures that benefit constituencies other than shareholders— employees, 
consumers (e.g., students of the FP college), society at large, and so on— are 
to be pursued only if, and to the extent that, they redound ultimately to the 
benefit of shareholders. Correspondingly, initiatives that would diminish 
shareholder returns are to be avoided. 
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Because of the near- hegemony the shareholder primacy norm enjoys, crit-
ics of FP higher education are led to believe that the FP institution will sacri-
fice student welfare whenever doing otherwise would lead to a loss of potential 
shareholder or managerial profits.32 Thus, for example, David W. Breneman, 
dean of the Curry School of Education at the University of Virginia, contends 
that “Wall Street has put [FP colleges] under inordinate pressure to keep up 
the profits, and my take on it is that they succumbed to that.”33 Prominent 
educators, students, and some of the University of Phoenix’s own former ad-
ministrators say the relentless pressure for higher profits has diminished aca-
demic quality34— for example, by propelling FP institutions to hire less 
experienced teachers, who do not command as high a salary, or deny admis-
sion to special needs students given the additional costs of accommodating 
them.35
Further, in addition to engaging in morally dubious cost- cutting mea-
sures, there is a concern that the FP college might incur expenditures that 
divert resources away from the students it does enroll. For example, given the 
extent to which FP colleges rely on student tuition for revenue, these colleges 
spend vast sums on marketing and advertising. Thus, the Apollo Group, 
which owns the University of Phoenix, spends roughly 20 percent of its reve-
nue on “selling and promotional” expenses.36 And according to the Harkin 
report invoked above, the investigated colleges had ten times as many recruit-
ers as career- services staff members— 32,496 and 3,512, respectively— 
 suggesting that these institutions are more intent on taking in tuition funds 
than training and placing their students.37 In contrast, FP advocates point out 
that the traditional sector is not without its own marketing imperatives. As 
Peter Smith quips, athletic directors at public and nonprofit institutions have 
to sell their schools to potential recruits too.38 And outreach efforts can ben-
efit members of underserved communities that might not otherwise have the 
wherewithal or resources to access information about higher educational op-
portunities.39 
More generally, FP advocates reject a zero- sum view of the FP entity, ac-
cording to which shareholder gains necessitate reductions in educational 
quality. Instead, at least some see student satisfaction and success as a key to 
shareholder wealth. Thus some FP advocates insist that at their institutions 
students absolutely come first— and they contrast this priority with the reign-
ing hierarchy at traditional institutions, which, these advocates maintain, tend 
to indulge and pander to the often prima donna- like attitudes of their fac-
ulty.40 
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To the extent that shareholder primacy entails that the firm maximize 
shareholder returns, the concern about the for- profit form has traction; a 
norm of shareholder maximization would entail that the firm pursue what-
ever initiatives benefit shareholders most, and it stands to reason that share-
holder value can sometimes be maximized only by sacrificing some amount 
of educational quality. For example, seniority pay and tenure help to retain 
better and more experienced faculty, but increase costs and thereby diminish 
shareholder profits; similarly, a well- stocked library, landscaped grounds, and 
state- of- the- art computer labs and athletic facilities can all enhance the qual-
ity of the student’s experience, but these too increase costs at shareholders’ 
expense. 
By contrast, a norm of shareholder primacy need not be so demanding; so 
long as the firm attends to and seeks to augment shareholder value, it has 
satisfied the norm. And it can do so consistent with sometimes foregoing 
more profitable opportunities, in order to ensure that its students receive a 
good- quality education. Nor does the law mandate maximization of share-
holder value. Instead, prominent statements of law permit corporate officers 
to pursue ethical objectives even if doing so fails to enhance shareholder value 
at all.41 To be sure, the corporation will fail to attract and retain investors if it 
does little or nothing to seek to turn a profit. But the quest for profit need not 
operate to the exclusion of the quest for quality.
The question, then, is not whether the FP college can afford to provide 
adequate quality, but instead whether it can provide an education or degree 
equal or superior in value to that provided by traditional colleges. Does the 
FP college have unique capacities or competencies that should cause us to 
welcome its presence on the higher education scene? 
For- Profit Colleges as Saviors
In 2009, President Barack Obama called for a doubling of the number of col-
lege graduates in the United States by the year 2020.42 For- profit advocates 
contend that public and NFP universities cannot meet that goal alone. In par-
ticular, only by enrolling nontraditional students could the country increase 
the number of degree holders so significantly.43 Enter the FP college.
Yet the FP’s aspired role is even loftier than that. The supporter of FP ed-
ucation aims not only to award college degrees to more people but in partic-
ular to recruit individuals who have historically, and in some cases 
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systematically, been excluded from traditional colleges, and to rescue them 
from their positions of relative disadvantage with the leg- up that a college 
degree provides. As one FP entrepreneur put it, the industry wants “to put ‘the 
flying car of higher education in the driveway of every student.’ ”44 In this way, 
champions and purveyors of FP higher education operate with a near- 
messianic vision.
More specifically, supporters of FP institutions believe that these institu-
tions are uniquely placed to serve the needs of traditionally underrepresented 
students. Thus, these supporters highlight the FP college’s ability to accommo-
date the needs and schedules of nontraditional college students. For example, 
whereas traditional colleges undertake lengthy admissions processes and have 
students matriculate at just a handful of fixed times over the course of the 
school year, FPs boast that they return prospective students’ requests for in-
formation within fifteen minutes, and can have the student begin courses 
within a month of the call.45 The FP colleges schedule courses in four- hour 
blocks, running from 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m., which makes it easier for stu-
dents to combine a full- time job with their studies.46 Many also offer courses 
online, which students can pursue on their own time, thereby further accom-
modating students’ work lives.47 
FPs provide flexibility not just in terms of scheduling but in terms of 
course offerings as well. Unlike their traditional counterparts, FPs can readily 
add classes or programs in response to changing demand. This greater respon-
siveness results in no small part from the FPs’ governance structure— typically 
centralized at corporate headquarters and uniform across campuses, unlike at 
traditional universities, where, for example, curriculum changes must be ap-
proved by faculty and can therefore take months if not years.48 
More generally, supporters of FP colleges note that market- based compe-
tition can motivate for- profit entities to deliver better quality at a smaller 
cost.49 FP institutions also have incentives to innovate, and their innovations 
can permeate the public domain or else motivate public institutions to pro-
duce innovations of their own, so as to compete. And FPs seem better able to 
make constructive use of new technologies than their traditional peers, as can 
be seen, for example, in the case of massive open online courses (MOOCs). 
These courses, typically taught by all- star professors at elite institutions, have 
the power to vastly improve the educational quality at FPs by allowing their 
students access to excellent instruction in courses rigorous enough to meet 
recognized accreditation standards. By contrast, MOOCs threaten to worsen 
the educational experience at a traditional institution, by eliminating intellec-
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tual diversity and rendering live instruction obsolete. Thus, for example, San 
Jose State University invited pushback when it proposed that its philosophy 
department replace some of their traditional ethics offerings with an online 
course entitled “Justice” taught by Harvard professor Michael Sandel. “The 
thought of the exact same social justice course being taught in various philos-
ophy depts. across the country is downright scary,” the philosophy depart-
ment wrote in an open letter objecting to the initiative. In a similar vein, 
Amherst College’s faculty voted against their school’s producing MOOCs out 
of concern that MOOCs threatened to impose too much uniformity and cen-
tralization on higher education. Diversity is the welcome corollary of the in-
tellectual freedom that pervades the traditional higher educational institution. 
As one commentator has put it, “When three great scholars teach a poem in 
three ways, it isn’t inefficiency. It is the premise on which all humanistic in-
quiry is based.”50 But FP higher education, for good or ill, is founded on a 
franchise model. If calculus 101, or poetry or ethics 101 for that matter, is to 
be taught in the same way to all of the FP institution’s students no matter what, 
it is best that the instructor and course content be drawn from the top ranks 
of the traditional institutions.
In sum, FP colleges promise benefits that traditional institutions currently 
fail to provide, and may even be structurally incapable of providing. The con-
sumer orientation of the FP institution may in principle increase traditionally 
disadvantaged groups’ access to higher education, and thereby enhance their 
socioeconomic status. And the centralized governance structure and market 
incentives of the FP sector may create more dynamic and innovative institu-
tions. At the same time, through the use of MOOCs, FPs may be able to offer 
their students the star power and quality instruction that elite institutions 
provide, without shortchanging their students by denying them the sponta-
neous and sometimes unique experiences emerging in the live classroom, 
since the FP was never going to offer its students those experiences in the first 
place. 
What this means is that, in theory, there may be much to celebrate about 
the ideal FP college. Unfortunately, however, the reality may look far different 
from the ideal. The promise of FP colleges, and the self- congratulatory market 
rhetoric of which it is a part, depends upon ideal market conditions that may 
not and, in some instances, do not obtain. For one thing, champions of the 
free market assume no information asymmetries between suppliers and con-
sumers. But it is notoriously difficult for prospective students to weigh the 
value and costs of particular higher education programs.51 It is for this reason 
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that Congress is currently contemplating legislation that would require all 
colleges to provide financial aid applicants with a “shopping sheet.”52 And to 
the extent that competition itself motivates greater transparency, so that con-
sumers can compare options, there arises a concern that the competing insti-
tutions will privilege quantitative indicators of success, thereby neglecting or 
deemphasizing softer but no less significant attributes.53 The dramatically in-
creased importance of standardized test scores provides evidence of this con-
cern.54
A second reason to be skeptical about the adduced benefits of market 
competition arises in light of the possibility that the requisite competition is 
absent: where the market is dominated by one entity, or supply is otherwise 
limited, the entity (or few entities) in question has fewer incentives to cater to 
its consumers. Students cannot readily transition between colleges: each in-
stitution may have different requirements for admission, or each may decline 
to award credit for courses completed elsewhere, or particular financial aid 
packages may not be transferable between institutions, or there may be only 
one game in town and the costs of moving elsewhere may be prohibitive. In 
short, exit is not a viable option for many.55 
In any event, concerns about the fairness of the market are just one piece 
of the puzzle; there is a more foundational issue— namely, whether there 
should be a market in this arena at all. Thus, even were perfect market condi-
tions to obtain, and even if FP colleges were genuinely and robustly consumer 
oriented, there would remain a question about the propriety of the market 
dynamic. For it may be that consumer satisfaction ought not to be an ultimate 
aim, let alone the ultimate aim, of higher education. No one doubts that indi-
vidual welfare gains constitute one worthy goal of a college education. But 
higher education has traditionally conferred benefits on society as a whole, 
both economic and political, and these may be threatened by the increasing 
presence of FP colleges. 
For- Profit Colleges and the Public Good
For- profit institutions boast that they can provide students with better job 
training than their traditional counterparts. “You don’t go to one of our 
schools to be a classics major,” the president of the Career College Association 
quips; their schools excel instead, he maintains, in conferring upon students 
skills “related to a real job in the real world.”56 This difference in educational 
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focus invites questions about what the goal of higher education should be and, 
indeed, whether the higher education landscape can accommodate diverse 
visions and aims, with some institutions more practically oriented and others 
furnishing a more traditional liberal arts education.
It is undoubtedly true that the workforce needs individuals who have re-
ceived highly specialized training— in culinary arts, medical and lab technol-
ogy, computer programming, and so on.57 But the concern is that students, as 
members of a democratic populace, should also be exposed to a particular 
canon of subjects, and trained in particular modes of critical thinking. Some 
maintain that a college degree— unlike a proficiency certificate— implies just 
this kind of training, and that institutions that fail to provide it should not be 
permitted to confer the degree. Further, we might also worry that education 
is too lofty or sacred an arena to be governed by market forces; the notion that 
disinterested investors may earn a buck off the backs of students threatens to 
taint higher learning not because (or just because) FP colleges will have an 
incentive to pander but because money- making seems to be fundamentally at 
odds with higher education’s foundational premises. I address each concern 
in turn.58 
Higher Education as a Public Good
From the time of the nation’s founding, higher education has been seen as a 
critical public good, developing students who could go on to serve the public 
as a result of the training they had received.59 Thus, for example, the Conti-
nental Congress insisted that some portion of land in the Northwest Territo-
ries be reserved for public institutions of higher learning.60 Further, at least 
two delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787 advocated for the federal 
government’s power to establish a college at the national level.61 Their cries 
were echoed by the first six presidents of the United States, each of whom 
beseeched Congress to establish a national public university. Contemporane-
ously, several state constitutions provided for the establishment of public uni-
versities within the state in question.62
The Founders, and their political successors, were committed to higher 
education because they saw in it “an extra- constitutional mechanism to pre-
serve the republic by broadening the diffusion of learning across social classes 
and enlarging the population of persons possessing the skills required for 
democratic governance and useful in diversifying the economy.”63 In this re-
gard, it is worth noting that the American Association of University Profes-
sors, from the time of its formation in 1915 through to the present day, has in 
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its successive articulations of its Declaration of Principles envisioned the uni-
versity as a “public trust,” given the role of “education [as] the cornerstone of 
the structure of society.”64 And the Campus Compact, an association of the 
presidents of more than 1,100 public and private universities, has issued and 
reaffirmed a Declaration challenging “higher education to re- examine its pub-
lic purposes and its commitments to the democratic ideal.”65
To be sure, a college degree confers upon the graduate a set of personal 
benefits— for example, it formally certifies that the degree holder has com-
pleted a particular course of study, it inducts the degree holder into a network 
of alumni who may function as useful personal and professional contacts, and 
it tends to allow the degree holder to earn more money than she would have 
earned without it. But higher education also enhances individuals’ prepara-
tion for the duties and activities of citizenship. Those with college degrees are 
more likely to vote, and exhibit a greater interest in civic and political issues, 
even controlling for social background and personality traits.66 College- 
educated citizens also display more social awareness, more political activism, 
and more humanitarianism.67 And society benefits from these outcomes as 
well, as greater numbers of college graduates generate increased charitable 
giving, lower public health costs, and a more diverse set of leaders.68 
Education, like health care, is, for all these reasons, taken to be a prereq-
uisite for both fulfilling one’s life plan, and creating and preserving a well- 
functioning democracy.69 Further, the more educated the populace, the 
greater the nation- state’s global standing. Even Milton Friedman, who advo-
cated a market- based approach to education through vouchers, argued that a 
“stable and democratic society is impossible without widespread acceptance 
of some common set of values and without a minimum degree of literacy and 
knowledge on the part of most citizens.”70 Or, to put the point even more 
succinctly, as Martha Nussbaum does in her bid to preserve a place for the 
humanities in higher education, “Without support from suitably educated 
citizens, no democracy can remain stable.”71
FP institutions undercut a connection between higher education and de-
mocracy by neglecting to prepare students for citizenship. As a dean at one FP 
college unabashedly stated, “For- profit universities do not have as their pri-
mary mission the shaping of a more informed citizenry, or creating a more 
cultured population, or helping young people understand their heritage, their 
society, and its values.”72 And it is not just that at least some FP institutions fail 
to enhance their students’ civic engagement; they may even worsen it in some 
regards. In particular, an exclusive focus on educating for specific professional 
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or vocational ends— what Martha Nussbaum calls “educating for profit”— 
 denies college students the opportunity to acquire or refine the rhetorical and 
critical thinking skills that democratic engagement requires.73 And the con-
sumer satisfaction model might encourage or further entrench existing class, 
ethnic, and racial divides, as students vote with their feet in selecting institu-
tions close to their already segregated neighborhoods, or whose student bod-
ies consist largely of other students like them, thereby insulating themselves 
from a more diverse student body that could improve cross- class and cross- 
cultural understanding. As Martha Minow writes, “Without regulation, more 
choice— including private religious options, for- profit options, and alterna-
tives serving specialized interests— could produce self- segregation along the 
fault lines of race, class, gender, religion, disability, and national origin. As a 
result, schools could exacerbate misunderstandings among groups and im-
pede the goal of building sufficient shared points of reference and aspirations 
for a diverse society to forge common bonds.”74 Elizabeth Anderson echoes 
the worry when she insists not only that public leaders “must be drawn from 
all sectors of society, including the less advantaged” but also that “these di-
verse members must be educated together, so that they can develop compe-
tence in respectful intergroup interaction.”75 
For these reasons, it is perhaps no wonder that “research suggests that 
students in the for- profit sector are less likely than students at nonprofit 
community colleges to vote, participate in political activities, or become in-
volved in their communities.”76 To the extent that this is true, the loss is not 
society’s alone. The relative lack of civic engagement threatens to undermine 
the promise of providing upward mobility for the underprivileged student 
that the FP college holds out in justifying its existence. For that mobility 
results not just from the enhanced material benefits that a college degree can 
confer but also from participation in public life with an eye to eradicating 
other kinds of structural barriers currently impeding the underprivilegeds’ 
success. 
And beyond the substantive ways in which FP colleges might deny their 
students the democratic training that students at traditional colleges receive, 
there is a further worry that FP education threatens the very ethos of demo-
cratic citizenship. As one commentator has evocatively stated in the context 
of K- 12 school choice, “The struggle is not between market- based reforms 
and the educational status quo. It is about whether the democratic ideal of the 
common good can survive the onslaught of a market mentality that threatens 
to turn every human relationship into a commercial transaction.”77 The con-
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cern loses no force when what is contemplated is higher education rather than 
primary and secondary schooling. 
Commodification
Worries about the incursion of a market discourse and rationale into the 
realm of education take many guises. For one thing, there is a general unease 
in subjecting something as (purportedly) lofty as education— especially 
higher education— to the base cost- benefit calculations that govern the mar-
ket.78 Further, delegation of a traditionally public function to a private entity, 
or the use of public dollars to fund a private entity, raises fears about a loss of 
public control and trust. The private school need not be responsive to the 
public will in the way that the public institution must be. To be sure, this con-
cern arises for both FP and NFP colleges, but the former occasions it to a 
greater degree, since the FP college may be subject to fewer government con-
straints and since it affirmatively has obligations to a constituency other than 
its students or the public at large— that is, its shareholders. “Public control and 
review— whether through administrative or political processes— diminish as 
previously public activities fall under private management and control.”79 And 
the consequences of the delegation might extend beyond a sense that the FP 
institution may proceed with indifference to the public will; delegation may 
undermine public trust more generally. As Martha Minow notes, “The ap-
pearance of private motives in a public domain can undermine respect for 
government and even generate doubt whether the government is sincerely 
pursuing public purposes.”80
More disturbing still, allowing for- profit entities to bridge the gap that 
traditional institutions have created obscures the fact that the public might 
bear responsibility for the gap in the first place. As Mark Rosenman writes, 
“Our elected leaders steadfastly refuse to generate the revenues government 
needs to do what needs to be done and instead favor an increasingly inequi-
table distribution of wealth . . .  ; politicians cut the funding of cost- saving 
programs [like those that would keep students in school or improve their 
performance there] to come up with new avenues for capital to make private 
profit in meeting public needs.”81 The incursion of profit- making entities into 
spheres traditionally occupied by the government undermines individual al-
truism, may lead to fewer charitable donations overall, and diminishes public 
spiritedness more generally, Rosenman argues.82
These are all compelling concerns. We have good reasons to worry about 
an erosion of public trust or altruistic sentiment, especially in light of the 
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economic downturn, which has diminished individual largesse and height-
ened voters’ resentment of those groups (for example, unions) that are seen as 
reaping undeserved concessions or social assistance. 
But it is not clear that the concerns mandate a ban on FP higher education, 
for it is not clear that the other- regarding sentiment that is (on this line of 
argument anyway) preserved or enhanced where the profit motive is absent 
will tend toward funding of higher education, less still that it will do so with 
the innovation and flexibility that the FP sector can provide. In other words, 
it may be unduly optimistic to think that the public will improve the educa-
tional opportunities of historically underserved populations when it has here-
tofore failed to do so; the FP market for higher education would not have 
arisen were traditional colleges already serving all of those who were candi-
dates for higher education as well as they could. As Martha Minow states, 
“The persistent failures in existing forms of social provision—in schooling 
[among others] . . .  — supply powerful reasons for government to work with 
the private forces of for- profit, secular nonprofit, and religious organizations.” 
The FP sector may provide a much- needed complement to traditional colleges 
and universities. It remains to be seen just what role the FP sector should play.
Conclusion: Ideal Versus Non- Ideal Worlds
In an ideally just world, every student has the opportunity and the resources 
to obtain a higher education— one that prepares the student both for the re-
alities of the job market into which she will enter and for the project of self- 
governance of the polity of which she is part. We do not currently inhabit that 
world (if we ever did). We should not abandon hope of realizing it and, in-
deed, we should work toward its realization. But we cannot in the interim 
repudiate any and every alternative that fails to meet the standards that we 
would impose in this ideal world. To do so would be to fetishize purity over 
practicality, with the burdens of the repudiation falling disproportionately on 
those whom the current system already marginalizes or excludes. We should 
instead welcome institutions, like FP colleges, that can fill in the current 
gaps.83 As Kevin Carey, policy director for Education Sector, an independent 
think- tank in Washington, D.C., writes: “The difference between what higher 
learning should be in theory and what it really is in practice (and what’s fea-
sible given the current economic and funding environment) is vast. And it’s 
in that space that new organizations are going to thrive.”84
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At the same time, we should seek to ensure that the presence of FP insti-
tutions does not entrench existing inequalities or otherwise impede progress 
toward a more ideal world. The general strategy flows from those theorists 
who view justice along two planes. The foundational plane articulates a con-
ception of justice that we would impose in a world where we could be assured 
of a material surplus and where individuals recognized the equality of all. This 
is the ideal world. A second plane begins at the point where we acknowledge 
that we do not live in this ideal world, and that we need to enact temporary 
measures that both respond to the current non- ideal circumstances and allow 
us to make progress toward the ideal world.85 In particular, these measures 
should “hinder the empowerment [of the disadvantaged] the least and further 
it the most.”86 
FP colleges can play a part in this non- ideal world, and so we should em-
brace them— but only with some careful qualifications and constraints. One 
element of this approach requires that we secure a robust opportunity for the 
public will, arrived at through democratic deliberation, to guide and constrain 
the operation of the FP higher educational sector. This is the suggestion Jef-
fery Smith advances in this volume,87 and others have expressed it as well.88 
But there is a prior question— namely, what the public should will on this 
score. The concerns about FP higher education described above provide the 
components of a response. 
Most obviously, there must be greater governmental regulation and over-
sight to protect against the worst abuses— fraud, deception, and exploitation. 
It is permissible, and even desirable, for FP colleges to target traditionally 
marginalized populations. But they should do so in a manner that allows the 
targeted populations to arrive at a robustly informed decision about the ben-
efits and costs of the education on offer, and without imposing undue pressure 
to consent.89 
We might also seek to ensure that FP colleges do good by their students 
even as they try to do well by their shareholders. To this end, we might man-
date that some percentage of the school’s profits be reinvested in the institu-
tion itself, or we might insist that FP colleges qualify for an accreditation, 
retention of which would require that the college meet certain barometers of 
student success. 
It is less clear that we could or should seek to insist that FP colleges pro-
vide (more) training for civic life. As niche institutions, FP colleges might 
focus on subjects having nothing to do with self- governance in a democratic 
polity, or they might recruit students from predominantly one social class, or 
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ethnic, racial, or religious group, thereby denying their students the opportu-
nity to mingle in a diverse environment. They could be encouraged to do 
otherwise, but the business model may make it unreasonable to demand that 
they do otherwise.90 Thus we might have to resign ourselves to having some 
other forum or institution encourage and prepare citizens for civic engage-
ment. (We could, for example, seek to improve the democratic training cur-
rently offered in K- 12 institutions, or insist that at least some not- for- profit 
entities, like churches, tax- exempt social clubs, and so on, devote some time 
and resources to fulfilling this role in exchange for their tax- exempt status, 
and consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association.) 
Concomitant with pursuing the specific measures aimed at the FP colleges 
themselves, we must seek to reform the background conditions that make FP 
colleges as attractive as they are. This is not the place to articulate a full- 
fledged plan, but we can identify some rough and ready ideas. First, we must 
find ways to make traditional colleges more accessible to underprivileged stu-
dents— for example, we might enhance the amount and quality of academic 
guidance students at public high schools receive, so they are better informed 
about their options and more effectively led through the various admission 
processes, or we might encourage colleges and universities to maintain more 
flexible schedules or to promote work- study opportunities in other ways, or, 
again, we might offer a year of postsecondary, college preparatory education 
to students who have attended failing public high schools. (This last measure 
would be more affordable than more widespread reform of the failing public 
schools, and would at least allow the students who suffered through these 
schools an opportunity to catch up.)
More significantly, we ought to remedy the background inequalities that 
put at least some traditional institutions beyond the reach of those students 
whom the public schools have largely failed. In an ideal system, the quality of 
primary and secondary education would not vary anywhere near as widely as 
it does currently, nor would the worst providers be anywhere near as dismal 
as they are now. More generally, there would be far less inequality of wealth, 
and the quality of the schooling available to children would not depend on the 
resources of their parents. 
In short, the background circumstances that set the stage for FP higher 
education are themselves deeply entrenched, and they will likely, and unfor-
tunately, persist for too many years to come. Given these circumstances, and 
the possibility that FP colleges can function at least as a stopgap measure to 
ameliorate their effects, we ought not to insist upon a wholesale rejection of 
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for- profit higher education. But we can require that FP colleges and universi-
ties operate in ways that do not worsen the unjust conditions that currently 
obtain; better still, we can seek to ensure that FP institutions actually help 
those who are disadvantaged to improve their lot. Profit making may be in-
imical to the ethos of higher education, and FP colleges may shortchange their 
students when it comes to training them for citizenship. But we do not now 
have the luxury to repudiate FP higher education altogether. To deny the dis-
advantaged student access to an FP college may well be to deny her access to 
any college at all, and so to consign her to the impoverished conditions she 
already inhabits. We should instead support a more highly regulated and con-
strained FP college sector, even as we seek to reform the injustices that pro-
vide the demand for FP colleges in the first place.
